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THE CHURCH AS NATION STATE: A NEW LOOK 
AT ULTRAMONTANE CATHOLICISM (1850-1900) 
PETER RAEDTS 
Nijmegen 
1. ?ecul(iri*sation and continui j 
One of the reasons that the secularisation thesis has been so immensely 
successful may well have been that its dire predictions for the future 
of religion in modern society halve been shared by most members 
of the Roman-Catholic hierarchy in th<: past two centuries.' From 
the Popes downward most Catholic leaders from 1800 on were con- 
vinced that the spread of liberty, the rise of industrial towns and the 
end of rural society were a threat to the survival of the Church. In 
thcir view the Church had reached the pinnacle of its power and 
influence a long timc ago, in the days of Innocent III (1198-1215), 
when Church and state, rcason and faith, freedom and obedience 
were happily united undcr the firm leadership of the Roman Pontiff. 
From then on it had been downhill all the way. Theological nom- 
inalism in the later Middle Ages had shattered thc: synthesis of faith 
and reason, the Reformation had ruined the authority of the Papacy, 
the Revolution in France was a frontal attack against Christianity as 
such, whereas at the same time the industrial revolution meant the 
end of the ordered hierarchical society without which religion was 
deemed to be impossible. 
The most famous formulation of that profound pessimism was 
perhaps the Syllabu.s Errorum, issued by Pope Pius IX in 1864, in 
which the Pope in no uncertain terms repudiated any possibility of 
reconciliation between the Church and progress. Subsequent events 
such as the fall of the Papal State in 1870, the Kulturkampfin Germany, 
the separation of Church and state in France in 1905, the dissolu- 
tion of the Habsburg Empire in 1918, and the Soviet conquest of 
' Two excellent recent surveys of the development of the secularisation thesis in 
H. McLeod, SecuLarisation i  6-'heslerra Europe 1848-1914 (London, 2000), pp. 4-12, and 
Callum G. Brown, 7he Death qf Christian Britain. Understanding Secularisation 1800-2000 
(London, 2001), pp. 10-14. 
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Catholic Eastern Europe after 1945 all seemed to confirm the Pope's 
diagnosis that Catholicism had no answer to the challenges of moder- 
nity and could only really survive in untouched rural pockets in 
Western Ireland or Southern Portugal. In this connection it should 
be noted that the many apparitions of the Virgin in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, that did so much to fostcr an intense new 
devotion among Catholics, all occurred in these rural backwaters, 
and also that Mary showed a definite preference for illiterate, usu- 
ally female, peasants as her mcasc:ngc:rs.2 The Catholic authorities 
did not need Max Weber to tell them that religion was incompati- 
ble with modernity, they had reached that conclusion long before 
him and their only hope was that the suflerings of the present time 
were not worth comparing to the glory to be revealed (cf. Rom. 
8, 18). The story of the Catholic Church in the past two centuries 
has been told, therefore, in terms of suffering and persecution, as 
that of the last stand of a dwindling minority of believers fighting 
off the irresistible rise of paganism. Because this story tied in so well 
with the dominant sociological diagnosis of the place of religion in 
modern society, most historians have taken the popes, the bishops, 
and the sociologists at their word and described the history of the 
Catholic Church since the French Revolution in terms of regression, 
entrenchment, and eventual disappearance. It will be my contention 
that these historians were wrong, that, in fact, the Catholic Church 
was remarkably successful in overcoming the blows of the French 
and industrial revolutions, that it adapted itself quite quickly to the 
demands of a new society and that in the years between 1850 and 
1960 it influenced thc lives of more people more deeply than ever 
before in its existence. 
But when trying to give some guidelines on how to rewrite the 
history of Roman Catholicism in the past two centuries it is not 
enough to be aware of the failure of the concept of secularisation. 
There is another storyline, still prevalent among Catholics that has 
to come under close scrutiny: the myth of the unique historical con- 
tinuity of the Catholic Church. When nineteenth-century Catholics 
compared their own Church with other Christian churches, they 
' A. Dahlberg, 'The body as a principle of holism. 'I'hree pilgrimages to Lourdes', 
in Contesting tlae Sacred. The Anthropologv of Christian Pilgrimage, eds. J. Eade and M J. 
Sallnow (London, 1991), p. 31. See also Ruth Harris, Lourdes. Geschiedenis van een 
religieus fenomeen (Amsterdam, 1999), pp. 107-22. 
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usually observed - in all humility, of course - that whereas other 
churches had been founded by humans such as Luther, Calvin or 
Henry VIII, the Roman Catholic Church had been founded by the 
divine Saviour himself, and had continued unchanged and true to 
its Founder in a long line of succession stretching from the apostles 
to the present. This unchanging continuity was supremely symbol- 
ised by the unbroken lineage of the successors of St. Peter and Vicars 
of Christ, the Popes. The Papacy was, and still is to many Catholics, 
the best proof that the Catholic Church is uniquely unchangeable 
and immovable, that it is, in fact, almost beyond history, perhaps 
now even more so than a hundred years ago, because the Papacy 
is, now that the last emperors have gone, the only institution left 
that has its roots in the ancient world. Catholic historiography has 
fully supported that view by emphasising thosc institutions and tra- 
ditions that survived or seemed to survive the centuries and con- 
cealing from view the many changes and discontinuities that any 
institution must of necessity go through in order to survive. Even 
critics of the Church often accept that self-image without asking ques- 
tions. To take one example: when discussing what happened after 
the Second Vatican Council many historians spoke of the end of 
Constantinian era or the fall of the Tridentine Church. But what- 
ever happened to the Catholic Church in the 1960s it had nothing 
whatsoever to do neither with the emperor Constantinc nor with the 
Council of Trent. Constantine's Church did not survive the fall of 
the Roman Empire in the West, and the Church of Trent perished 
ingloriously in the crisis of the French revolution. The Catholic 
Church that collapsed in the nineteen sixties was a product of the 
nineteenth century, of the era that, characteristically, was named 
Restoration, but was in, fact, one of thoroughgoing modernisation. 
2. Post-revolutionary chances and challenges 
The Catholic Church in the nineteenth century faced two major 
challenges: the disengagement of Church and state and the rise of 
nationalism.3 The first challenge proved manageable quite early on. 
The French Concordat of 1801, although abused by the clergy at 
the time as a defeat for the ancient rights of the Church, was in 
v R. Remond, Reli?ion and S'oeiety in Modem Europe (Oxford, 1999), pp. 107-108. 
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fact a good example of how to deal with states that for some rea- 
son or other no longer recognised Catholicism as their only and/or 
state religion.' It became the model for similar treatises with Bavaria, 
Prussia, Austria and even Russia. Everywhere the Holy See had to 
agree to the immense loss of Church property that had occurred in 
the course of the Revolution and of the many privileges the Church 
had enjoyed for centuries. But on the other hand, after a while even 
the Roman Curia had to admit that with the loss of privileged sta- 
tus it had also got rid of the meddlesome interference of Catholic 
monarchs, who before the revolution had always been trying to make 
their own state churches as independent from Rome as possible. 
Everyone in Rome remembered vividly how it was the concerted 
action of the Catholic princes that in 1773 forced the Pope to dis- 
solve his staunchest defenders, the order of the Jesuits, after it had 
already been dissolved in France in 1764. Also remembered was the 
humiliation of Pope Pius VI who, in 1782, took the extraordinary 
step of travelling all the way to Vienna to beg the emperor Joseph 
II to desist from reforming the Austrian Church without so much 
as even consulting the Pope. His mission was a complete failure; the 
emperor remained "courteously unyielding".' Although in the nine- 
teenth century the relations between Church and states were often 
very difhcult, a subject to which I shall return later, such high-handed 
interference of states in the life of the Church began to disappear 
with the increasing separation between the two and once the Church 
had got used to its new status even the most conservative prelates 
began to see its distinct advantages, not the least of which was the 
much increased power of the Holy See within the Church, in the 
eyes of most nineteenth-century Catholics, definitely a good thing.' 
The rise of nationalism posed a far greater threat to the existence 
and the influence of the Catholic Church than separation of Church 
and state. It is now accepted by all historians that nations and nation 
states are not 'universal and perennial' historical phenomena but that 
4 Jacques Lc Goff and Rene R6mond, eds., Histoire de la France reli?ieuse, 4 vols. 
(Paris, 1988-92), 3: Du roi Tre.s Chrétien a la laïcité ripublicaine, I I 1 - 1 5. 
' O. Chadwick, The Popes and European Revolution (Oxford, 1 98 1), p. 418; for the 
dissolution of the Jesuits see pp. 345-90. 6 The last example of direct interference by a Catholic prince in the election of 
a pope was during the conclave of 1903, when the emperor Francis Joseph of 
Austria, through the Bishop of Krakow, cardinal Puszyna, vetoed the election of the 
then Secretary of State, cardinal Rampolla, to the Papacy. 
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to a large extent they were formed in the nineteenth century.' The 
construction of nation states was an answer to the combined chal- 
lenges of industrial society and the transport revolution that brought 
people who, for centuries, had lived in separate, local communities 
with their own religion, customs and language, much closer together 
and forced them to find a new cultural and political unity that tran- 
scended the local.8 Th<: national state was th<: outcome of that process. 
Its success was so phenomenal and, indeed, universal, that states that 
did not succeed in transforming themselves into nations, such as 
Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, did not survive. The late 
twentieth century saw a new upsurge of national feeling that resulted 
in the collapse of the two last multicultural empires in Europe, the 
Soviet-Union and Yugoslavia. 
There is something very peculiar to nationalism that makes it very 
different from political ideologics, such as liberalism and socialism. 
National feeling had, and still has, strong religious features, it appeals 
to people not just as political beings or consumers, but in their total- 
ity. It inspires love and self-sacrifice. We have become used to it, 
but if you think about it there is something odd about the fact that 
millions and millions of young men in the two last centuries were 
prepared to die for their fatherland as a matter of course.`' Up till 
the French Revolution war had been always been left to profes- 
sionals. Ordinary citizens were not actively involved. Dying was a 
professional risk that was seldom talked about, let alone glamorised. 
All that changed with the first ler?ee en masse in France in 1794, when 
for the first time all patriotic Frenchmen were called up to defend 
the endangered nation.'° From then on war became the ultimate test 
of loyalty to the nation. It was talked about in religious terms: dying 
on the battlefield was a sacrifice on the altar of the fatherland and 
the dead were presented as martyrs in a holy cause. It is that aston- 
ishing ability to mobilisc people totally that distinguishes nationalism 
from all political philosophies of the last two centuries. Even com- 
munism, with all its claims to make sense of all aspects of life, was 
7 E.A. Gellner, Nationalism (London, 1997), p. 7. 8 For France this process is brilliantly described by E. Weber, Peasants into 
Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France 1870-1914 (London, 1979). 9 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread qf 
Nationalism, 2nd ed. (London, 1991), pp. 141-44. 
' 
10 N.C.F. van Sas, Talen van het r?aderland. Over patriottisme en nationalisme (Amsterdam, 
1996), pp. 10-11. 
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never able to move so many people so completely. In 1941 Stalin 
had to present the war against Germany as a defence of Holy Russia 
before he got the Russians moving. 
It is obvious that the strong religious feelings evoked by the nation 
were a threat to all churches. In the worst case it could make them 
superfluous, because it was now the state that could take card of all 
the needs that had been the domain of organised religion in prc:vi- 
ous centuries. And it certainly is true that in certain circles of the 
enlightened liberal bourgeoisie nationalism did, indeed, take the place 
that religion had had there before. But such secular devotion to the 
nation remained exceptional. On the whole the churches dealt with 
the challenge of nationalism quit<: successfully by writing themselves 
into the script. For most protestant and Orthodox churches that was 
made easier by the fact that they had a long tradition of being state 
churches that had always recognised the prince as the head of their 
organisation. It was not too difficult for them to make the change 
and present themselves as the church of the people, the organisa- 
tion that embodied the noblest aspirations of th<: nation. And the 
existence of a national church also proved that the nation was the 
assembly of God's elect, that had a mission to all the world. England 
and Russia arc perfect examples of such a successful transformation 
of the state church into a national church. The Church of England 
not only justified the building of the British Empire as a religious 
duty, it also, by presenting itself as the comprehensive church of the 
middle (the via media), emphasiscd the essentially benevolent and mod- 
erate nature of British political rule." In Russia the Orthodox Church 
with its traditional emphasis on ritual and mysticism and its distinct 
lack of learning came to be seen as the perfect expression of the 
simple, strong, but obedient Russian peasant soul. 12 But in Holland, 
too, many Protestants tried to reinterpret Calvinism as the religious 
expression of the tolerance and love of liberty that had always char- 
actcrised thc Dutch from the moment they abjured Catholicism and 
the rule of the King of Spain.13 
For the Roman Catholic Church it was not so easy to come to 
terms with the nation state. All Christian churches taught, of course, 
" McLeod, Secularisation (see above, n. 1), pp. 235-37. 12 Remond, Reliyion and Society (see above, n. 3), pp. 85, 87, and 110. 1:\ Peter van Rooden, Religieuze regime,s. Over godsdienst en maatscliappij in Nederland, 
7J7C-7 C (Amsterdam,1996), pp. 147-68. 
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that Christianity was universal and that its message had to be preached 
to all nations. But only the Roman Catholic Church made that 
potential universality of the Christian faith visible in its organisation, 
most of all in the person of thc: Pope. To all Catholics the Papacy 
represented the truth that in the end only God had power over all 
peoples and nations on carth. Even though it is true that the Pope 
had very littlc actual power in the Church before 1850, his mere 
presence in Rome had been, since the eleventh century, a testimony 
to thc fact that first there was an authority higher than that of thc 
king, the state and the nation, namely thc authority of God and sec- 
ondly that no state could claim to represent that authority, but only 
the Vicar of Christ, the Pope. In the heroic struggle of Pope Pius 
VII against the tyrant Napoleon nineteenth-century Catholics had 
seen a shining example of moral force and of what happened to a 
prince who transgressed the limits set by God and the Church. Pius' 
victory and Napolcon's fall reassured Catholics, if they needed it, 
that no state could ever have the last word on anything but remained 
subject to the law of God. That was an unpalatable truth for the 
new nation states and made them deeply suspicious of their Catholic 
subjects, a suspicion that deepened when in 1870, during the First 
Vatican Council, the Pope was pronounced to be infallible in mat- 
ters of faith and morals. 
In non-Catholic countries Catholics were accused of serving two 
masters, their own state and the priest-king ultra montes. In recently 
united Germany it came to a Kulturkampf during which the govern- 
ment actively tried to separate the Catholics from the authority of 
Rome and the Pope.'' In Ireland and Poland the Church became 
the focus of opposition against the efforts of the state authorities to 
destroy local culture and to enforce Anglicisation or Russification.1' 
But in Catholic countries, too, national aspirations came into colli- 
sion with the Church. Th<: problem there was that traditionally the 
Church had been the most powerful institution in the land owning 
vast amounts of property and controlling most of education and char- 
ity. Resentment against the power of the Church and its clergy had 
14 Kurt Nowak, Geschichte des Christen turns in Deutschland (Miiiicheii, 1995), pp. 
149-58. 
15 For Poland see Norman Davies, Playground. A History oj'Poland, 2 vols. 
(Oxford, 1983-85), 2: 222-23; for Ireland: J. Hutchinson, Tlae dynamlcy of CulturaL 
Nationalism: The Gaelic Revival and the Creation of the Irish Nation State (London, 1987), 
pp. 103, 114, 136-37, 233-34, and 287-88. 
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been rampant for more than a century in countries, such as Italy, 
France and Spain. That hostility translated itself in the nineteenth 
century into a liberal, national ideology that was consciously anti- 
clerical. The Church was excluded from the discourse of nation, and 
defined not as a part of the nation's inheritance but as a competi- 
tor for the hearts of the people. In France this caused a split in 
national consciousness that was not healed until the To be 
fair, there were efforts in Catholic countries to include Catholicism 
in a nationalist ideology, such as falangism in Spain and in France 
the Action But strangely enough the Roman authorities 
opposed these movements, although reluctantly, because they felt 
that Catholicism transcended everything and thus could not be part 
of something else. And it was thc Pope who symbolized that nations 
were subject to God and the Church, and not the other way round. 
3. Modernisation in the guise of restoration 
But the Catholic Church did not remain a passive bystander that 
only reacted to the modernisation of society. In the second half of 
the nineteenth century the Church went through a radical mod- 
ernisation process that oddly enough, can be described in exactly 
the same terms as the transformation from traditional states into 
nation states. Ernest Gellner has, in a still influential book, described 
that process of transformation. His argument is that in an agrarian 
society state and culture do not overlap. Pre-industrial statcs consist 
of a large number of quite separate, local, oral low cultures, that 
are loosely held together by a small elite of soldiers and clc:rks (in 
a later book he speaks of the Rcd and the That small elite 
is the only part of the population that participates in a higher supra- 
local written culture. So, in agrarian states many different cultures 
on many different levels can quite happily exist together within one 
state without causing any problem. 
But industrial society requires rationality and uniformity. Industry 
cannot properly function in a society that is governed by hundreds 
"' Claude Langlois, `C:atholiquc:s et laics', in Picrre Nora, ed., Les lieux de mémoire, 
III: Les Franee, 1: Conflits et partages (Paris, 1992), pp. 140-83. 
" E. Weber, ActÙmfrançaise: Royalism and Reaction in Twentieth-Century France (Stanford, 
1962), pp. 34-35. 
'
"I Gellner, NationaLism (see above, n. 7), pp. 15-16. 
E.A. Gellner, Nations and NationaLism (Oxford, 1983), pp. 9-14. 
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of different customs and traditions, it needs a society with a ratio- 
nalised bureaucracy, where in the same situation the same rules apply 
to everyone everywhere. Industrial society also nceds large reservoirs 
of people who are able communicate with each other. Formal edu- 
cation, therefore, can no longer bc confined to a small elite; it 
becomes a basic necessity for everyone. The whole population must 
be mobilised to keep industry going. But it is not enough that every- 
one gets educated, everyone must be educated the same way, because 
only when people share the same outlook and the same culture they 
will be able to form the lines of communication that an advanced 
society requires.20 So what happened in the course of the nineteenth 
century was that in most states the writtc:n culture of the elite was 
imposed on the whole of the population, to create the larger cul- 
tural units that could sustain industrialisation. Local cultures were 
quite deliberately destroyed, and people were forced to become part 
of a much larger and much more homogeneous cultural network 
that became known as the 'Nation', in which state and culture now 
coincided. Nationalism, in Gellner's view, is the ideology designed 
to soften that transformation and to make it bcarable. The new-fan- 
gled nations were presented as the natural and universal organising 
principle of all historical development. Historians rewrote Europe's 
history as the history of nations that had their origin in the Germanic 
and Slavic invasions of the carly Middle Ages and, since then, had 
either developed gloriously and continuously (France and England), 
or had been suppressed and lain dormant for centuries to be awak- 
ened now (Germany, Italy and most of Slavic nationalisms)." 
My point is that the Catholic Church in the nineteenth century 
went through a process of bureaucratisation, mass mobilisation and 
cultural homogenisation that was very similar to the formation of 
nation states. Up till the middle of the nineteenth century the Catholic 
Church can best be described as a loose federation of local churches, 
presided over by the Pope. At the top there always had been a cer- 
tain unity of doctrine and discipline, although the power of the local 
churches, in the first place the Ecclesia Gallicana, should not be under- 
estimated. Undcrnc:ath there was a confusing variety of customs and 
traditions that could difter from region to region and village to vil- 
lage. But after 1850 the Church changed into a tight bureaucratic 
20 Ibid., 19-38. 2. Ibid., 40-50. 
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organisation with a common homogeneous culture that was designed 
to embrace the life of ordinary Catholics everywhere in all its aspects, 
political, social, cultural and religious. The Church also developed 
its own national ideology, ultramontanism, thus called because the 
centre of the Church state was 
'beyond the mountains', in Rome. 
Just like any other national state the Church developed its own 
national standard (yellow-white), its national anthem, and its ordcrs 
of knighthood to reward deserving Catholics for their services to the 
Church. What the Catholic Church after 1850 did, was to try and 
create an alternative to the national state, or perhaps more precisely, 
to change the Church into a national state which surpassed all other 
states, because of its divine origin and its universal destination, to 
gather all peoples of the world into one Catholic nation. The visi- 
ble unity of the Church, supremely realised in its uniform liturgy, 
was the expression of the "nationalit6 unique en Occident", as it 
was aptly put by the Benedictine monk Prosper Guéranger. 22 Thus 
in an age of nationalism the Catholic church by presenting itself as 
the supreme nation statc, tried to impress upon its faithful that their 
first loyalty was still to God and the Church, and only after that to 
the nation state they inhabitcd. 
This far-reaching modernisation of the Church was justified in the 
same way as in the new national states, with an appeal to history. 
Fundamental renewal was presented as a restoration of the medieval 
Church. The Middle Ages had been in fashion since the beginning 
of the nineteenth century. Romantic authors, such as Novalis, Schlcgel, 
de Maistre and Chateaubriand, had brilliantly argued that the chaos 
and confusion of the French Revolution could only be overcome, if 
Europe returned to the one true faith and on the basis of that faith 
established a community of nations under the leadership of the Pope, 
as it had been in the Middle Ages, when all princes had accepted 
the arbitrational powers of the Holy See. That romantic nostalgia 
for a (largely imaginary) medieval past, in which the Pope had 
allegedly been the supreme guardian of justice and peace, became 
the foundation of ultramontane ideology.23 Oddly enough, initially 
such romantic reveries about the role of the Pope in society met 
22 Peter Raedts, 'Prosper Gueranger O.S.B. (1805-1875) and the Struggle for 
Liturgical Unity', in Gontinuity and Change in Christian Worship, ed. R.N. Swanson 
[Studies in Church History 35] (Woodbridge, 1999), p. 342. 23 Remond, Religion and Society (see above, n. 3), pp. 92-96. 
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with considerable opposition in Rome itself. The Roman Guria did 
not want any renewal but a complete rcstoration of the relation 
between throne and altar, as it had existed before 1789.24 And when 
negotiating with princes it was unwise to emphasise the power of 
the Popc too much. 
4. Administrative centralisation 
The events of 1848 changed all that. Just like all other European 
courts the Roman Curia was deeply shockc:d by the destructive rev- 
olutionary spirit that came to thc surface once more in that year. 
The Pope himself had to flee from Rome in disguise to escape from 
the fury of thc crowds. In the aftermath of that revolutionary year 
the Roman authorities began to listen to what the romanticists had 
said fifty years before, that there could be no peace, harmony and 
unity in the world without a restoration of the all-embracing pow- 
ers of the medieval Roman Pontiffs. From 1850 it became the con- 
scious strategy of the Roman authorities to concentrate all power in 
the Church in Rome. Ancient privileges, if thc:y had survived the 
French Revolution, were revokcd. For the first time in history it 
became official policy in Rome to concentrate the appointment of 
bishops in thc hands of the In their own dioceses the bish- 
ops, too, monopolised all appointments. Ancient rights of patronage 
were abolished, where they still existed (Germany, Austria-Hungary). 
More horizontal and collegial administrative bodies, such as national 
synods and chapters, that had survived from earlier days and had 
always acted as a check on papal or episcopal authority, were abol- 
ishcd or their power was severely curtailed. Even informal meetings 
between bishops were discouraged or forbidden, their only contacts 
should be with their priests on the one hand and the Holy See on 
the It was ominous that the administrative model that the 
A. van de Sandc, La Curie romaine au debut de la restauration; le ?robleme de la conti- 
nuité dan.s la politique de restauration du Saint-Siège en Italie, 1814-1817 ('s-Gravenhage, 
1979), p. 190. 25 It took considerable time to implement that policy. E.g. it was not until after 
the death of Franco in 1975 that Spain gave up the privilege of appointing its own 
bishops. 
For one example among many see Klaus Schatz, Zwischen Shkularisation und 
zweitem Vatikanum. Der Weg de.s deutschen KàthoLizi,.smus im 79. und 20. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt 
a.M., 1986), pp. 105-106. 
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Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith had originally devel- 
oped for missionary countries increasingly became the norm for all 
the Church; it meant more power for the Roman Curia without any 
new form of accountability. How scrious the consequences were is 
obvious when for one moment we try to imagine a situation in which 
the Indian Civil Service would have become the model for admin- 
istrative reform in Britain. In such a systcm the whole hierarchy 
became nothing more than the executive arm of the Papacy, a per- 
fect, rational top down bureaucracy that had no other duty than fol- 
lowing orders from above. The French ultramontane priest abbe 
Combalot remembered the day of the proclamation of the dogma 
of the Immaculate Conception on December 8th 1854 and noted: 
"All eyes were focussed on the Pope, the bishops counted for noth- 
ing, they were like altar That about describes it. 
Another example of Roman centralisation policy was the change 
in education of the clergy. Since the sixteenth century there had 
been seminaries in Rome to educate priests for Protestant countries 
that had no seminaries of their own. The oldest and most famous 
was thc Collegium Germanicum, founded by the Jesuits in 1552 for the 
North German mission. Others were the English and Irish Colleges. 
In the second half of the nineteenth century the function of these 
seminaries suddenly changed. The Roman Curia began to put a lot 
of pressure on all national hic:rarchies, even in Catholic countries, 
to found national seminaries in Romc and to send their brightest 
seminarians, destined for higher things, thcrc to be educated at the 
Papal universities. It was a perfect way of crcating a new suprana- 
tional ecclesiastical elite, deeply attached to the Roman See and 
imbued with Romanità, the virtue to see all problems through the 
eyes of the Curia. In 1846 the Belgian bishops opened a seminary 
in Rome, followed by the South American countries in 1858, thc 
United States in 1859, and Spain in 1892. By the end of the cen- 
tury it became virtually impossible to get any advancement in the 
Church without an education in one of the Roman colleges." 
27 A. Gough, Paris and Rome: The Gallican Church and the Ultramontane 1848- 
1853 (Oxford, 1986), p. 221. 28 Peter Raedts, 'Tussen Rome en Den Haag: de integratie van de Nederlandse 
katholieken in kerk en staat', in De eenheid en de delen. ??uilz?ormin? onderwijs en natier:orming 
in Nederland 7850-7900, eds. Henk te Velde and Hans Verhage (Amsterdam, 1996), 
pp. 36-37. 
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Centralisation was accompanied and made palatable by new cer- 
emonica and rituals. Never before had the person of the Pope been 
an object of devotion. It is quite likely that most Catholics in the 
eighteenth century did not even know the name of the reigning 
Ponti! Pope Pius IX (1846-78) was the first Pope, whose portrait 
decorated the walls of Catholic homes and whose image was pre- 
served in prayer His reputation among Catholics soared even 
higher whcn the Italian army occupied Rome in 1870 and the Pope 
`imprisoned' himself in the Vatican. It was as if he bore the Cross 
of Christ. The bishop of Geneva spoke of the three Incarnations of 
Christ: in the womb of the Virgin, in the Eucharist and in the old 
man in the Vatican. 30 Large pilgrimages to Rome became normal 
once the new railroad network had made the journey short and 
cheap. To see the Pope in Rome became a dream four which many 
poor Catholics saved for a lifetimc. Papal court ceremonial, that had 
always been executed in the privacy of the Vatican or the Quirinal 
and to which only the happy few, such as Goethe," had been admit- 
ted, was now moved to St. Peter's Square or other public places, 
where large crowds could attend." Personal events in the life of the 
Pope such as his birthday or a jubilee, became public occasions. 
When Pope Pius IX celebrated his golden jubilee as a priest on April 
11 th 1869, the Dutch poet-priest Schaepman called it a turning point 
in the history of humankind. 
At the same time ordinary Catholics were mobilised with all the 
means that the modern mass media put at the disposal of the Church. 
Strategies were devised to turn all baptised Catholics into practising 
members of the Church.33 Responsible and worried Church leaders 
M.N. Ebertz, 'Herrschaft in der Kirchc; Hierarchie, Tradition und Charisma 
im 19. Jahrhundert', in Zur Soziologie des Katholizismus, eds. K. Gabriel and F.X. 
Kaufmann (Mainz, 1980), p. 109: "Ausseralltaglichkeit ... und dic erstmalige mas- 
senhaftc Verbreitung des Papstbildes als kleines Andachtsbild ein altes und be- 
wdhrtes Propagandamittel der Jesuiten - stcigcrn die Verehrung des Papstes zur 
Christifikation". 
Aubert, Ie ?ont?cat de Pie IX [Histoire de depuis les origines jusqu'd 
nos jours 21] (Tournai, s.a.), p. 303. 31 See his - rather hilarious description of his attendance at the Pope's pri- 
vate Mass in the Quirinal on All Souls' Day, 2 November 1786, in,J.W. von Goethe, 
Italienische Reise. Hamburger Ausgabe, ed. H. von Einem (Munchen, 1992), p. 127. 
Klaus Schatz, Vaticanum I 1869-1870 [Konziliengeschichte, Reihe A: Darstel- 
lungen], 3 vols. (Paderborn, 1992), 1: 22. 33 Ebertz, 'Herrschaft in der Kirchc' (see above, n. 29), pp. 103-108, calls it 
"Organisierung der Massenreligiositdt". 
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considered, what they now began to call the 'apostasy of the work- 
ing classes', as one of the greatest dramas of the century. Now it 
certainly was true that the influence of the Church in the lower 
ranges of society had always been small. But it was not until the 
second half of the nineteenth century that it was made into a problem 
that had to be solved. It was presented as a decline from the high 
medieval standards, although the reality probably was that the pro- 
letariat had never had mor<: than a nominal connection with the 
Church and the Christian faith. What was new was that the Church 
no longer resigned itself to the impossibility of reaching out to the 
lowest and poorest, but became conscious of the situation and tried 
to devise schemes to preach the Gospel to people in which it had 
never been much interested before. 
Far more important was that the Catholic Church was very quick 
to realisc that the spread of education to all segments of the popula- 
tion, so characteristic of the nineteenth-century modernisation, offered 
many new possibilities of bringing people into contact with the faith. 
Wherever possible the Church tried to get control of the public 
school system. Where that was not possible or no longer possible, as 
in France after 1870, a Catholic school system was set up with an 
astonishing speed. In all parts of Europe and America bishops and 
parish priests founded new religious congregations, mainly of women, 
with the express purpose of securing good and cheap education for 
as many Catholics as possible. The numbcr of new foundations went 
into the thousands by the end of thc century. And the old orders, 
too, both of monks and friars, more and more turned themselves 
into teaching organisations to meet the insatiable demand for Catholic 
education.31 And once young Catholics had left school, an ever- 
growing Catholic press, in a rich variety of newspapers, illustrated 
magazines and devotional booklets, followed them in the home and 
the workplace to remind them of their sacred duties and commitments. 
The main reason that the mobilisation strategy proved so suc- 
cessful was that at the same time as the Church tried to reach out 
to all Catholics, it also created a new and homogeneous Catholic 
3' Although all these foundations claimed to have their own purpose and spiri- 
tuality, they were, in fact, remarkably similar, because, with the exception of the 
strictly contemplative orders such as the Trappists, they all ended up doing exactly 
the same work: the spread of the new Catholic culture through education, missions 
and publishing. See the highly original work of R. Hostie, hie et mort des ordres 
religieux. Approches psychosocioLogiques ([Paris], 1972), pp. 236-51, 264-73. 
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culture that proved extremely popular. I start from the top. From 
quite early on in the century Rome put an end to all theological 
diversity. German theologians, such as Gunther and Hermes, who 
tried to reconcile idealist philosophy with Catholic doctrin<: were 
called to order, the writings of the convert John Henry Newman, 
perhaps the most original Catholic mind of the century, were sim- 
ply ignored. Rome promoted the revival of medieval scholastic the- 
ology instead. In 1879 Pope Leo XIII went even further and in the 
encyclical Aetemi Yatris proclaimed that all Catholic theology had to 
be founded on the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas "inter scholasticos 
doctores omnium princeps ct magister". From then on even the study 
of such medieval luminaries as Scotus or Bonaventure was discouraged 
or forbidden.3' This undoubtedly had the effect of turning the Catholic 
clergy into a hermetically sealed body of elect who communicated 
in an arcanc language and reference system that even to ordinary 
Catholics was incomprc:hensible, let alone to the rest of the world. 
In the liturgy, too, the Roman authorities pursued the ideal of 
complete uniformity and with success. In 1840 most dioceses of 
France still had their own liturgy and were proud of it. In the next 
forty years the Roman liturgy was introduced in all French diocc:- 
ses, the last diocese that gave up its own traditions was Orleans in 
1875.3b The same happened in Germany. Once the liturgy had been 
reformed, it was the turn of sacred music. Orchestras were banned 
from churches, mixed choirs that performed modern church music 
(Rossini, Gounod, Verdi) were disbandcd and replaced by all male 
choirs that specialised in the restored medic:val Gregorian chant or 
in sixteenth-century Roman polyphony (Palestrina, Lotti) It is fair to 
say that, despite considerable pressure from Rome, the musical rc:form 
was much less of a success than the liturgical. In Germany and 
Austria most churches held on to their mixed choirs and orchestras 
and rarely turned from Mozart, Haydn or Schubert to plainchant. 
For the first time the participation of the faithful in the liturgy was 
actively encouraged. Translations of the Roman missal became very 
popular, parishes organised liturgical weeks to explain the Mass to 
the faithful, and instead of silently watching the priest perform his 
Thomas F. O'Meara, C,hurch and Culture: Gerrraan Catholic 7]ieology 1860-1914 
(Notre Dame, 1991), pp. 28-29, 33-35; Otto Weiss, Der Modemismus in Deutschland 
(Regensburg, 1995), pp. 48-56. 36 Gough, Paris and Rome (see above, n. 27), pp. 1 19-30, 168-80. 
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rituals attendants at Mass were encouraged to say out loud the 
responses. 
All these efforts to promote the official liturgy were only partially 
successful. Liturgical uniformity certainly instilled a strong feeling in 
Catholics that all over thc world they were one nation, praying to 
God in one languagc. But the official liturgical ritual was too remote 
from ordinary life and too chilly to appeal to ordinary people and 
turn them into morc enthusiastic and committcd Christians. Ultra- 
montane Catholics were acutely aware of the fact that, if they wanted 
to mobilise the Catholic people, more popular forms of worship were 
nceded, that went straight to the heart. They had to fight for that, 
because in the early nineteenth century most priests still clung to 
the tenets of seventeenth-century Jansenism and eighteenth-century 
Enlightened Catholicism. They condemned most forms of popular 
devotion as magic, loathed pilgrimages, processions, relics and weep- 
ing statues of the Virgin, they distrusted monks and their ascetic 
practices and they preached a stern, responsible and strongly cahi- 
cal faith without smells end bells. In their view Christ had never 
spoken a truer word than when He had said: Many arc called, but 
few arc chosen. They were so convinced of the decp sinfulness of 
humankind that they actively discouraged their faithful from going 
to Holy Communion, unless when absolutely necessary. ?17 
When in the 1840s the first ultramontane generation of priests 
became active, they saw it as their first priority to combat such elit- 
ism that, in their opinion, had alienated ordinary people from the 
Church for centuries now. Instead they wanted to bring the people 
into contact once more with the extravagant devotions and mystical 
riches of the Middle Ages that the Jansenist clergy had wanted to 
eradicate. In 1844 the bishop of Trier decided to put Christ's robe 
(Heiliger Rock), preserved in the cathedral treasury, on display. Most 
educated German Catholics, laity and priests, were horrified at thc 
spectacle and some accused the bishop of wilful fraud. But it was 
an immense popular success, more than a million Catholics travelled 
to remote Trier to venerate the relic. 38 In fact, the display of the 
Jacques Gadille and Jean-Marie Mayeur, eds., Histoire du claristianisme d s origines 
a nos joun, 14 vols. ( [Paris] , 1 9 9 0- 2 0(1 1 ) , 1 1 : Libéralisme, industrialisatÙm, expansion 
ettropeertne, 123-27. 
W. Detzler, 'Protest and Schism in Nineteenth-Century German Catholicism: 
The Ronge-C:zerski Movement', in Schism, Heresy and religiou.s Protest, ed. D. Baker 
[Studies in Church History 9] (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 341-42. 
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Robe proved a decisive turn in thc history of German Catholicism, 
for the first time German Catholics rallicd proudly round their bish- 
ops expressing their unity in the face of a nation that thought 
Catholicism was un-German. It was also the first time that the ultra- 
montane strategy to create or restore more popular and warmer 
forms devotions proved its worth. Apparently it was possible to reach 
out to ordinary Catholics, but then the barriers had to bc lowered 
and forms of worship that to an earlier generation had seemed super- 
stitious or magical, or both, had to be revived and promoted. 
But while pretending merely to revive medieval devotions ultra- 
montane Catholics considerably changed them in content and scopc. 
Veneration of saints who were of no more than local significance 
was discouraged or terminated. The reformers only promoted devo- 
tions that could have an appeal to all Catholics. The three most 
important were the devotion to the Blessed Sacrament, to the Sacred 
Heart, and abovc all, to the Virgin Mary. More than any of the 
other two, Marian devotion became the hallmark of nineteenth- 
century Catholic piety':\9 In 1854 Pope Pius IX set the seal of official 
approval on this development with the solemn proclamation of the 
dogma of Mary's Immaculate Conception, an event that was sym- 
bolic both of the centralisation of power (never before had a Pope 
proclaimed a dogma outsidc a Council of the Church) and of the 
change of tone in Catholic worship. 
5. Pilgrimage 
The many apparitions of the Virgin at the same time led to the 
revival of yet another custom that had bcen frowned upon by an 
earlier generation, pilgrimage. Marian pilgrimage perfectly fitted into 
the ultramontane strategy to substitute new univcrsalisc:d devotions 
for traditional localised religious practices.40 Turner has argued that 
pilgrimage temporarily frees people from their everyday role in local 
society and by throwing them back on their individuality during the 
journey opens them up for the inclusive and universal values pro- 
claimed by the sanctuaries they are travelling to. Although this the- 
39 Gcrard Cholvy and Yves-Marie Hilaire, Histoire religieuse de la France contempo- 
raine, 3 vols., 2nd ed. (Toulouse, 1990), 1: 1800-1880, 169-85. 40 C?adillc and Mayeur, eds., Histoire du clarisLianisme (see above, n. 37), 129; Cholvy 
and Hilaire, Histoire religieuse (see above, n. 39), 191-96. 
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ory has come under scrutiny,?' for my purpose it explains perfectly 
why the Catholic authorities so actively began to foster pilgrimage 
to Marian sanctuaries from the 1850s on. Ancient sites of pilgrim- 
age, such as Rocamadour, Loreto and Altotting, which had fallen 
on bad times in the age of Enlightenment, were revived. But far 
more important were the new sites where Mary put in an appear- 
ance : La Salette (1846), Pompei (1875), Knock (1882), Fatima (1917), 
and the most successful of all, Lourdes (1858). 
In 1858 the young shepherdess Bernadette had several appari- 
tions of a 
'lady' in a grotto near the river Gave. When Bernadette 
asked who the lady was, she revealed herself to be the Immaculate 
Conception. To the local clergy that was a sign of Bernadette's 
authenticity, for how could an illiterate girl know about the dogma 
that had been proclaimed four years before: it must have been a 
revelation .4' From then on success came quickly. In 1867 Lourdes 
was linked to the railway network, and the pilgrims began to flock 
to the miraculous grotto, first in their thousands, later in the mil- 
lions each year. 
Lourdes is the perfect example of the way in which the Church 
in the second half of the nineteenth century mobilised its faithful 
and tried to shape them into one universal, homogeneous Catholic 
body, under tight direction of a centralised and bureaucratised Papacy. 
Although Bernadette herself never so much as mentioned the Pope 
when reporting about her visions, the bishop of Tarbes, and later 
the Roman authorities, were not slow in rec:ognising that the events 
in Lourdca, if handled the right way, could constitute a powerful 
supernatural confirmation of the new role of the Papacy. Mary, by 
calling herself, according to Bernadette, the Immaculate Conception, 
four years after the dogma had been proclaimed, implicitly confirmed 
that the authority of the Pope in the Church was unique and ranked 
high above that of the bishops, that it was, in fact, infallible. 41 
At the same time the elaborate rituals, processions and chants 
used during the pilgrimage in Lourdes became a common memory 
to Catholics all over the world, and thus created a shared identity 
that proved very strong. No one who participated could ever forget 
the candle processions at night or the blessing of the sick at the 
41 Eade and Sallnow, eds., Contesting tlte ,Sacred (see above, n. 2), pp. 4-5. 42 Harris, Lourdes (see above, n. 2), pp. 32, 97-98, and 186. 43 Eade and Sallnow, cds., Contesting the Sacred (see above, n. 2), p. 32. 
494 
grotto by day." All pilgrims brought home water (preferably in bot- 
tles shaped in the form of the Virgin) from the miraculous source 
that Bernadette had dug near the grotto. Its healing forces made 
pilgrimages to local sanctuaries superfluous. Copies of the grotto, in 
which Mary had appeared, were erected everywhere in the Catholic 
world, and often replaced local sanctuaries. In a small village near 
Rc:don in France the age-old pilgrimage to the chapels of St. 
Marccllinus (against fever) and St. Lawrence (against burnings) ceased 
suddenly once the Lourdes grotto had been built. The ancient sanc- 
tuary at Mont-Dol that had always been dedicated to St. Michael, 
and to a pagan god before that, was now crownc:d with a life size 
statue of the Virgin.!:) French priests in those years liked to speak 
of this constant copying of the same religious symbols as "industries 
de a happy phrase that expresses the essential modernity of 
the religious mobilisation that took the Catholic world in its grip 
between 1850 and 1900. 
6. Cozzr,lusion 
As I said in the beginning, the history of the Roman Catholic Church 
since 1800, has usually been described, not in the least by Catholics 
themselves, in terms of crisis and decay, as if, in a rapidly chang- 
ing world, the Church was a venerable relic of days gone by. What 
I tried to argue was that another description fits the facts far better. 
It is possible to describe the transformation of the Catholic Church 
in the same terms as the transformation of states into nations: ratio- 
nalisation and centralisation of the administration, mobilisation of all 
the people, and the creation of a low-brow, homogeneous, common 
culture. 
An objection could be that this modernisation was all about form, 
but not about content. Was not ultramontanism the complete denial 
of modern industrial society and of everything th<: French Revolution 
stood for? That is true, but in that, too, the Catholic Church was 
44 For a description of the pilgrimages and the 'miraculous' healings see Harris, 
Lourdes (see above, n. 2), pp. 258-331. 45 M. Lagr?e, 'Religion populaire et populismc religieux au XIX" siecle', in: 
Histoire vécue du peuple chrétien, ed. J. Delumeau, 2 vols. (Toulouse, 1979), 2: 169. 46 H. Jedin, ed., Handbuch der Kirchengescllichte, 7 vols., 2nd ed. (Freiburg i.B., 1985), 
VL 1: Die Kin'he zr.e?ische.n Revolution und Restauration, p. 439. 
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no exception. Most new nation states tried to soften the brutal impact 
of the process of modernisation by presenting it as a restoration of 
times gone by or by suggesting continuity where, in fact, there was 
none. Historians havc called this the 'Invention of Tradition'.47 And 
most nations defined their individual character by contrasting it with 
revolutionary France. In Germany it became commonplace to com- 
pare the profundity of German Kultur, founded in the medieval 
empire, restored in the nineteenth century, with the superficial and 
unhistorical Zivilisation of the West, where the only things that counted 
were ruthless competition, egalitarian democracy and rampant indi- 
vidualism. The English liked to contrast their own continuous his- 
tory of growing freedom and prosperity with the unhappy revolutionary 
convulsions on the continent of Europe. 
Likewise the Catholic Church presented itself as the weak and 
lone guardian of the sacred in a world of rampant sc:cularism and 
paganisrn. As never before the Church emphasised those elements 
in doctrine and ritual that distinguished it from the surrounding 
world and from the Zeitgeist. Clerical attire was never more deliber- 
ately different from normal fashion than in the nineteenth century. 
Miracles, relics, apparitions, medieval logic, they were nothing to be 
embarrassed about, but in their stark contrast to everything mod- 
ern, in their apparent weakness and folly, they uniquely visualised 
the sacred and the supernatural. And nowhere that cherished absur- 
dity was more keenly perceived that in the position of the Pope. 
Ultramontanc Catholics, as we have seen, turned the Pope almost 
into a living God on earth. In theory he was not only the infallible 
head of the Catholic Church, but he was also the king of kings, the 
natural leader of the world to whom all princes should turn for coun- 
sel. In fact, the Pope was the inhabitant of a minor, decayed capi- 
tal in a corrupt, backward country and, after 1870, a prisoner in 
his own palace. It was that complete contrast between theory and 
fact that the ultramontanists confirmed in their faith that 'the fool- 
ishness of God is wiser than men, and the weakness of God is stronger 
17 E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge 1983), 
p. 2, define 'invented traditions' as "responses to novel situations which take the 
form of reference to old situations, or which establish their own past by quasi-oblig- 
atory repetition. It is the contrast between the constant change and innovation of 
the modern world and the attempt to structure at least some parts of social life 
within it as unchanging and invariant, that makes the 'invention of tradition' so 
interesting for historians of the past two centuries". 
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than men'(l Cor. 1,25). The Church's weakness was the best proof 
of God's triumph. And to make sure of that triumph Catholics liked 
to tell their story as one of persecution, suffering, and defeat. But I 
hope to have shown that as a diagnosis of what happened to the 
Catholic Church in the nineteenth and the first half of the twenti- 
eth centuries it is completely misleading. 
Macauley, who saw things from the height of enlightened unbe- 
lief, had no doubts whatsoever about the surviving powers of thc 
Roman Catholic Church. As early as 1840 he wrote in a review c>f 
Ranke's history of the Papacy: 
The papacy remains, not in decay, not a mere antique, but full of life and 
youthful vigour... [and then of the Church] Nor do we see any sign which 
indicates that the term of her long dominion is approaching. She saw the 
commencement of all the governments and of all the ecclesiastical establish- 
ments that now exist in the world; and we feel no assurance that she is not 
destined to see the end of them all. She was great and respected before the 
Saxon had set foot on Britain, before the Frank had passed the Rhine, when 
Grecian eloquence still flourished in Antioch, when idols were still worshipped 
in the temple of Mecca. And she may still exist in undiminished vigour when 
some traveller from New Zealand shall, in the midst of a vast solitude, take 
his stand on a broken arch of London Bridge to sketch the ruins of St 
" Thomas Babington Macauley, Criti'cal and Hi.stnrical FfSqyS, 2nd ed. (London, 
1874), p. 548. 
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